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CHILDREN AND THE FIRST VERDICT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
DIANE MARIE AMANN∗ 
Days before she was sworn in as the new Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda 
told a New York audience: “In the International Criminal Court, children, 
including girls, will not be invisible.”1 She affirmed that promise a few 
months later, pledging on the first-ever International Day of the Girl Child, 
“I shall continue to include gender crimes and crimes against children in 
our charges and to bring the full force of the law to bear on those most 
responsible for them.”2 Bensouda’s declarations underscored the degree to 
which the fate of children in armed conflict has formed a cornerstone of 
the ICC’s early jurisprudence. 
This attention to the plight of children marked a notable development 
in the seven-decade history of international criminal justice. No mention 
of children appeared in either the 1945 Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg or the instrument that set up the 
subsequent Nuremberg tribunals.3 The same was true of the Tokyo 
Tribunal charter and, for that matter, of the Charter of the United Nations.4 
The silence of these post-World War II documents stood in stark contrast 
 
 
 ∗ Emily and Ernest Woodruff Chair in International Law, University of Georgia School of 
Law. A version of this Article was presented on a panel entitled “The Early Jurisprudence of the 
Court,” at the “International Criminal Court at Ten” symposium, November 12, 2012, sponsored by 
the Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute at Washington University School of Law, St. Louis. The 
manuscript was completed before my December 2012 appointment by International Criminal Court 
Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda as her Special Adviser on Children in and affected by Armed Conflict; this 
Article is published in my personal capacity and does not purport to set forth any position of the ICC. 
My thanks to my students Kaitlin M. Ball, Blake Evans, Erika Furlong, Sarah A. Hassan, and Mahdi 
Abdur-Rahman, who have comprised the Georgia Law Project on Armed Conflict & Children, and to 
Georgia Law librarians Anne Burnett and T.J. Striepe, for research assistance. 
 1. Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor-elect of the Int’l Crim. Ct., June 4, 2012, Keynote Speech before 
the Eng Aja Eze Foundation in New York: The Incidence of the Female Child Soldier and the 
International Criminal Court (June 4, 2012), available at http://cpcjalliance.org/international-day-
african-child/. 
 2. Press Release, Statement ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda on International Day of the Girl 
(Oct. 11, 2012), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/ 
office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/reports%20and%20statements/statement/Pages/statement-11-10-
2012.aspx. 
 3. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 
82 U.N.T.S. 279; Control Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes 
Against Peace and Against Humanity, Amtsblatt of the Control Council in Germany, No. 3, 31 Jan. 
1946, at 50. 
 4. See U.N. Charter; Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo, 
§ III, Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589. 
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with the many references to children in the foundational instrument of the 
post-Cold War permanent international court.5 
Drafters explained in the preamble of that last instrument, the Rome 
Statute, that “for the sake of present and future generations,” they 
undertook to establish the ICC “[m]indful that during this century millions 
of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities 
that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.”6 The statute they produced 
at the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference not only required the Prosecutor 
to “appoint advisers with legal expertise on specific issues, including . . . 
violence against children,” but also mandated that in composing the ICC 
bench, states parties “take into account the need to include judges with 
legal expertise on . . . violence against women or children.”7 At several 
points, the statute admonished the Prosecutor and other ICC officials to 
adjust proceedings to accommodate the needs of children.8 Unlike in the 
Nuremberg Charter, furthermore, concern for young victims was made 
explicit in the Rome Statute’s enumeration of offenses. Included as one of 
the five acts that may constitute genocide punishable by the ICC was 
“[f]orcibly transferring children of” a protected “group to another group.”9 
Enslavement, one of eleven acts that may amount to a crime against 
humanity, was defined in the statute with express reference to the 
trafficking of children.10 Finally, the Rome Statute named “[c]onscripting 
or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years” into an armed force, 
 
 
 5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered 
into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Statute or Rome Statute], available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-5752-4F84-BE94-0A655EB30E16/0/Rome_Statute_English.pdf. 
 6. Id. pmbl. 
 7. Id. arts. 36(8)(b) (setting out qualifications for judges), 43(9) (authorizing advisers to the 
prosecution). 
 8. See id. art. 54(1)(b) (including “age” among the “personal circumstances of victims and 
witnesses” to which investigation and prosecution must be adjusted, and further requiring the 
Prosecutor to “take into account the nature of the crime, in particular where it involves sexual 
violence, gender violence or violence against children”); id. art. 68(1) (requiring that in adopting 
victim or witness-protection measures, “the Court shall have regard to all relevant factors, including 
age . . . and the nature of the crime, in particular, but not limited to, where the crime involves . . . 
violence against children”); id. art. 68(2) (permitting in camera proceedings or “electronic or other 
special means” of testimony, particularly in case of “a child who is a victim or a witness”). 
 9. Id. art. 6(e). The provision’s chapeau specifies which groups are protected, stating that 
enumerated acts are prohibited when “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” Id. art. 6. 
 10. Id. art. 7(2)(c) (stating that this act “means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching 
to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of 
trafficking in persons, in particular women and children”). 
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“or using them to participate actively in hostilities,” as war crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the ICC.11 
It was on those last offenses that early prosecutions focused. The war 
crimes of recruiting and using child soldiers were charged in multiple 
cases arising out of the situations in Uganda and in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.12 The ICC’s first trial, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
dealt exclusively with those crimes.13 The experiences of children thus 
underlay the ICC’s first verdict; that is, the conviction, sentencing, and 
reparations decisions that ICC Trial Chamber I issued in Lubanga in 
2012.14 Examining those three decisions, this Article discusses how Trial 
Chamber I treated both child soldiering and, more broadly, the issue of 
children in armed conflict. The Article concludes by touching on prospects 
for the ICC’s future treatment of these matters. In recognition, however, of 
Ambassador Stephen Rapp’s description of international criminal justice 
 
 
 11. With slight variations in wording, the proscription was extended both to international armed 
conflicts and to non-international armed conflicts. Id. arts. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), 8(2)(e)(vii). 
 12. On Uganda, see descriptions of cases against Joseph Kony and Dominic Ongwen, both 
fugitives. Uganda: ICC-02/04-01/05, INT’L CRIM. CT. (ICC), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/ 
situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/Pages/situation%20index.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2013). On cases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see generally Democratic 
Republic of the Congo: ICC-01/04, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20 
cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/Pages/situation%20index.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 2013); 
see also infra note 13. 
 13. See infra notes 40–108 (analyzing decisions in Lubanga). Child-soldiering charges also 
formed part of the second trial, which proceeded against two other men alleged to have been 
Congolese militia leaders. See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, No. ICC-
01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶¶ 246-3 (ICC Pre-Trial Ch. I, Sept. 30, 2008), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf (describing these charges). After trial concluded, 
the cases were severed and one defendant was acquitted. See Procureur c. Mathieu Ngudjolo, No. ICC-
01/04-02/12, Jugement rendu en application de l’article 74 du Statute (ICC Trial Ch. II, Dec. 18, 
2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1529535.pdf. As of August 2013, the judgment of 
acquittal had been appealed, and judicial deliberations in the remaining case, Katanga, continued. See 
Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC Released Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui from Custody Following His 
Acquittal (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20 
releases/Pages/pr868.aspx (noting Prosecutor’s appeal of acquittal); Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC 
Trial Chamber II Acquits Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_ 
menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr865.aspx (stating that the verdict in 
Katanga would be released at a later date). Given that the verdict in Ngudjolo postdated the 
presentation described supra note ∗, this Article does not analyze it, but rather focuses on the decisions 
in Lubanga.  
 14. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute (Mar. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Lubanga Judgment], http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc 
1379838.pdf; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Sentence pursuant to 
Article 76 of the Statute (July 10, 2012) [hereinafter Lubanga Sentencing], http://www.icc-cpi.int/icc 
docs/doc/doc1438370.pdf; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Establishing 
the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparations (Aug. 7, 2012) [hereinafter Lubanga 
Reparations], http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1447971.pdf. At this writing the case remains on 
appeal. 
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as a single project whose roots may be found at Nuremberg,15 this Article 
first makes a foray into history. 
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW RESPECTING CHILDREN 
To say that midtwentieth-century charters made no note of children is 
by no means to say that the plight of children in World War II went 
unnoticed. Several thousands were rescued via Kindertransport.16 Other 
children were combatants. They fought for Germany; they fought for 
Russia; and they fought in resistance movements in occupied lands.17 
Many, many children suffered. Select children were forcibly made 
adoptees of German families, in furtherance of Nazi policies.18 Children 
endured forced labor and violence, and children perished, in concentration 
camps.19 These facts struck me, if I may speak personally, in a barracks in 
Austria. In a visit to the Mauthausen concentration camp decades after its 
liberation, the sight of a mountain of small shoes conveyed, with horrid 
immediacy, the full tragedy of the Holocaust. The only exhibit that has 
stirred similar emotion was the secret annex in Amsterdam that gave 
shelter to Anne Frank.20 Teenagers made up a fifth of the inmates at 
 
 
 15. See Stephen J. Rapp, Address at Washington University ICC at 10 Conference (Nov. 2012); 
see also Stephen J. Rapp, Remarks at Opening of the Nuremberg Trials Memoriam (Nov. 21, 2010), 
available at http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/us_releases/remarks/2010/151884.htm (stating that “the legacy 
of Nuremberg lives in the international courts of the 21st century”). 
 16. See JUDITH TYDOR BAUMEL-SCHWARTZ, NEVER LOOK BACK: THE JEWISH REFUGEE 
CHILDREN IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1938–1945, at 1–2 (2012) (stating that by means of “the 
Kindertransport Movement,” nearly 10,000 children, mostly from Germany, Austria, and 
Czechoslovakia, “found refuge in Great Britain between December 1938 and September 1939”). 
 17. See OLGA KUCHERENKO, LITTLE SOLDIERS: HOW SOVIET CHILDREN WENT TO WAR, 1941–
1945 (2011) (reporting on Soviet child combatants during World War II); DAVID M. ROSEN, ARMIES 
OF THE YOUNG: CHILD SOLDIERS IN WAR AND TERRORISM 22 (2005) (“Children were part of virtually 
every partisan and resistance movement in World War II.”); Philipp Kuwert et al., Trauma and Post-
Traumatic Stress Symptoms in Former German Child Soldiers of World War II, 20 INT’L 
PSYCHOGERIATRICS 1014, 1015 (2008) (writing that “[o]ne of the less known historical facts of World 
War II is the recruitment of approximately 200,000 German children as soldiers by the Nazi 
government”) (citing HANS-DIETRICH NICOLAISEN, DIE FLAKHELFER: LUFTWAFFENHELFER UND 
MARINEHELFER IM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG (1981)). 
 18. See Kjersti Ericsson, Introduction, in CHILDREN OF WORLD WAR II: THE HIDDEN ENEMY 
LEGACY 4–7 (Kjersti Ericsson & Evan Simonsen eds., 2005) (describing the Nazi Lebensborn program 
that operated in Norway and other occupied states). 
 19. See PATRICIA HEBERER, CHILDREN DURING THE HOLOCAUST 149–90 (2011) (discussing 
children and concentration camps); see generally TARA ZAHRA, LOST CHILDREN: RECONSTRUCTING 
EUROPE’S FAMILIES AFTER WORLD WAR II (2011) (examining conditions at refugee camps, in which 
numerous children were concentration camp survivors). 
 20. See Francine Prose, Introduction, in ANNE FRANK, THE DIARY OF A YOUNG GIRL viii–ix 
(Otto H. Frank & Mirjam Pressler eds., 2010) (originally published in Dutch as HET ACHTERHUIS 
(1947)) (describing the Franks’ secret annex). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/6
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Mauthausen,21 and Frank was fifteen when, having been found and 
arrested after two years in hiding, she succumbed to typhus at the Bergen-
Belsen camp.22 That both wrenching memorials centered on young victims 
attests to the special grip that children have on what Professor Mark 
Drumbl, in his book on child soldiers, called the “international legal 
imagination.”23 
Though conducted according to international charters that omitted 
mention of children, the post-World II accountability process nevertheless 
helped to train international attention on how war affects young people. 
The first Nuremberg judgment referred a dozen times to children.24 For the 
most part the tribunal simply mentioned children alongside women and 
men; an example is its quotation of an affidavit in which Otto Ohlendorf, a 
Nazi who would incur the death penalty in a subsequent trial, stated that 
his Einsatzgruppe had “‘liquidated approximately 90,000 men, women 
and children.’”25 Three of the judgment’s passages went further, 
illustrating the special vulnerabilities of childhood. The tribunal wrote in 
one such passage of the Nazi practice of forcing pregnant slave laborers to 
abort “if the child’s parentage would not meet the racial standards . . . .”26 
In another, it relayed a Nazi leader’s boast about the forced-adoption 
program: “‘What the nations can offer in the way of good blood of our 
 
 
 21. See Bundesministerium für Inneres (Austria), Mauthausen Memorial, Audio Guide 07: Block 
11—Children and Adolescents in Mauthausen, http://en.mauthausen-memorial.at/db/admin/de/show_ 
article.php?carticle=341&topopup=1 (last visited Aug. 1, 2013). 
 22. See Sylvia P. Iskander, Anne Frank’s Reading: A Retrospective, in ANNE FRANK: 
REFLECTIONS ON HER LIFE AND LEGACY 100, 106 (Hyman Aaron Enzer & Sandra Solotaroff-Enzer 
eds., 1999) (writing of “[t]he untimely death of Anne Frank from typhus at Bergen-Belsen 
concentration camp just two months prior to the end of the war”); Prose, supra note 20, at x (stating 
that after two years in hiding, Frank was arrested, and died from “malnutrition and disease” at the 
camp). 
 23. MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 9 
(2012) (defining this term, used throughout the book, as the “normative, aspirational, and operational 
mix of international law, policy, and practice—constituted as it is directly and indirectly by a broad 
constellation of actors”). Although Drumbl finds scant use of the term in international law, it resonates 
with the concept of the “imaginary” familiar to social science theorists. See CHARLES TAYLOR, 
MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 23 (2004) (describing concept of “social imaginary” in terms similar to 
Drumbl’s use of “imagination”). 
 24. I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
235–37, 245, 248, 251–52, 260, 273 (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment] (containing principal 
judgment’s references to “children”); id. at 362 (containing mention of “children” in dissent by 
General Iona Nikitchenko, the Soviet judge). The principal judgment, dissenting opinion, and 
pronouncement of sentences, delivered on Sept. 30 and Oct. 1, 1946, are reprinted in full id. at 181–
367. 
 25. Id. at 235 (quoting Ohlendorf affidavit). On Ohlendorf’s conviction and sentence to death by 
hanging, see 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER 
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 509–12, 590 (1949). 
 26. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 24, at 260. 
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type, we will take. If necessary, by kidnapping their children and raising 
them here with us.’”27 In a third passage, the tribunal focused on 
conditions in the concentration camps. “‘Children of tender years were 
invariably exterminated since by reason of their youth they were unable to 
work,’” a Nazi official had stated in an affidavit, from which the tribunal 
quoted at length.28 He had continued: “‘Very frequently women would 
hide their children under their clothes, but of course when we found them 
we would send the children in to be exterminated.’”29 
Direct testimony at the Trial of the Major War Criminals likewise had 
adduced grim evidence of the unique relationship of children to atrocity. In 
the following examination, the witness Ohlendorf—the same man whose 
Einsatzgruppe affidavit is excerpted above—answered questions put to 
him by the tribunal’s Soviet judge, General Iona Nikitchenko: 
Q: And in what category did you consider the children? For what 
reason were the children massacred? 
A: The order was that the Jewish population should be totally 
exterminated. 
Q: Including the children? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Were all the Jewish children murdered? 
A: Yes.30 
Discernible both in this battery of questions and in the judgment 
passages quoted is a perception that the killing of the youngest, most 
vulnerable, and most innocent persons constitutes an especially grave 
transgression, one that society must especially endeavor to prevent and 
punish. But a very different perception also is discernible: in the minds of 
génocidaires, survival of the young and innocent carries promise that a 
 
 
 27. Id. at 237 (quoting October 1943 statement by Nazi leader Heinrich Himmler). 
 28. Id. at 251–52 (quoting affidavit by Rudolf Höss, the first commandant of the Auschwitz 
concentration camp). 
 29. Id. at 252 (quoting Höss). The Tokyo Tribunal’s verdict of November 13, 1948, contained 
three references to offenses against “men, women and children,” one to a massacre of “women and 
children,” and one to Japan’s inculcation of “schoolchildren” with “ultra-nationalism.” I THE TOKYO 
JUDGMENT 96, 388–89, 396, 399 (B.V.A. Röling & C.F. Rüter eds., 1977). 
 30. 4 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
337–38 (1947) (setting forth trial proceedings on Jan. 3, 1946). For ease of reading, this Article uses 
“Q” and “A” in lieu of the original’s use of “OHLENDORF” and “THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. 
Nikitchenko).” 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/6
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group will endure, and thus poses an especial threat to the perpetrators’ 
genocidal project. Given Nuremberg’s exposure of this clash of views, it is 
perhaps not surprising that, even as trials continued, states inserted in 
postwar legal instruments expressions of particular concern for the fate of 
children. 
Signaling this development were two documents that the U.N. General 
Assembly adopted in December 1948: the Convention Against Genocide, 
which first articulated the ban on forcible transfer of children that would 
be reaffirmed a half century later in the Rome Statute;31 and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which accorded “special care and 
assistance” to “childhood,” and extended “social protection” to all 
children.32 Less than a year later, states adopted the Geneva Conventions 
on the laws and customs of war, the fourth of which set out a host of 
requirements intended to assure the identification, education, health, and 
well-being of children, during conflict and under occupation.33 The 1977 
Additional Protocols to those conventions prohibited the recruitment of 
children under fifteen into armed forces,34 and further insisted that 
captured child soldiers, no less than other children caught up in armed 
 
 
 31. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. II(e), Dec. 9, 
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. In its list of underlying acts and its statement of contextual elements, Article II 
of the Genocide Convention is identical to the ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 6, quoted supra note 9 
and accompanying text. 
 32. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 25(2), G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/810 
(Dec. 10, 1948) (proclaiming in full that “[m]otherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and 
assistance” and that “[a]ll children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social 
protection”); see id., art. 26(1) (mandating free education “at least in the elementary and fundamental 
stages”). 
 33. Convention (No. IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 14, 
17, 23, 24, 38(5), 50, 82, 89, 94, 132, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The extent of these protections 
becomes evident on comparison with the single reference to “children” in the first codification of the 
laws and customs of war. Known as the Lieber Code in recognition of its drafter, it provided that 
commanders should “inform the enemy of their intention to bombard a place, so that the 
noncombatants, and especially the women and children, may be removed before the bombardment 
commences.” Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General 
Orders No. 100 (Lieber Code) art. 19 (U.S. War Dept. Apr. 24, 1863). In contrast with contemporary 
codifications, the same article of this Civil War-era code continued: “But it is no infraction of the 
common law of war to omit thus to inform the enemy. Surprise may be a necessity.” Id. 
 34. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 77(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (providing that “Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible 
measures in order that children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part 
in hostilities” and specifying that such parties “shall refrain from recruiting” children under fifteen 
“into their armed forces”); Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 3(c), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II] (stating that “children who have not attained 
the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part 
in hostilities”). 
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conflict, must receive special protections.35 The 1989 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child affirmed those norms.36 In the ensuing decade, the 
issuance of Graça Machel’s milestone U.N. report on children and armed 
conflict,37 coupled with media coverage of child soldiers,38 laid the 
groundwork for the prohibition on recruiting and using young children that 
is entrenched in the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC.39 
Thus it was that in March 2006, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, then the ICC 
Prosecutor, announced that militia leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was in 
custody at The Hague, accused of conscripting, enlisting, and using 
children under fifteen in 2002 and 2003, amid a protracted armed conflict 
in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.40 In apparent 
explanation of his choice to charge only offenses related to child soldiers, 
the Prosecutor declared: “These are extremely serious crimes. Forcing 
 
 
 35. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 34, arts. 70(1), 77, 78; Additional Protocol II, supra 
note 34, arts. 4(3), 6(4); see also Howard Mann, International Law and the Child Soldier, 36 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 32, 32–50 (1987) (describing context within which the protocol provisions were adopted). 
 36. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 38, Nov. 20, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 37. U.N. Secretary-General, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Report of the Expert of the 
Secretary-General: Ms. Graça Machel, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 1996), available at 
http://www.unicef.org/graca/a51-306_en.pdf. Given space constraints, this Article omits discussion of 
the many other international initiatives related to this issue. 
 38. E.g., Joel Brinkley, Uprising by Arabs Losing Momentum, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1991, at A5, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/12/world/uprising-by-arabs-losing-momentum.html 
(quoting Palestinian professor’s call for excluding children from participation in anti-Israel “revolt”); 
John Darnton, Civil War of Nearly Two Decades Exhausts Resource-Rich Angola, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 
1994, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/09/world/civil-war-of-nearly-two-decades-
exhausts-resource-rich-angola.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (reporting that Angolan rebels “carried 
off young boys to turn them into child soldiers”); Jeffrey Goldberg, A War Without Purpose in a 
Country Without Identity, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 22, 1995, § 1, at 37, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/1995/01/22/magazine/a-war-without-purpose-in-a-country-without-identity.html (relating 
interviews with child soldiers in Liberia); Bill Keller, In Mozambique and Other Lands, Children 
Fight the Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1994/11/09/world/in-mozambique-and-other-lands-children-fight-the-wars.html (writing of child 
combatants not only in Mozambique, but also “Sudan and Liberia, Angola and Rwanda, Afghanistan, 
Cambodia and the Middle East”). 
 39. ICC Statute, supra note 5, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), 8(2)(e)(vii); see also supra text accompanying 
note 11. An analogous proscription proved central to prosecutions in the later-established Special 
Court for Sierra Leone. See DRUMBL, supra note 23, at 122–24, 144–49 (describing the Special 
Court’s structure and jurisprudence); Diane Marie Amann, Calling Children to Account: The Proposal 
for a Juvenile Chamber in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 167 (2001) 
[hereinafter Amann, Children] (examining initial plan to prosecute child combatants). Reasons of 
space prevent analysis of the work of that court. 
 40. Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
Press Conference in Relation With the Surrender to the Court of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, The 
Hague (Mar. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Moreno-Ocampo statement], http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/69 
9D1671-4841-4AAC-BFF4-1F1BF3F9DFEC/143842/LMO_20060318_En1.pdf; see Lubanga Judgment, 
supra note 14, ¶ 1 (stating 2002–2003 time period covered by the charges); see also Diane Marie 
Amann, International Decision: Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 809 (2012) [hereinafter 
Amann, Lubanga] (summarizing conflict). 
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children to be killers jeopardises the future of mankind. We are committed 
to putting an end to these crimes—it’s our special duty pursuant to the 
Rome Statute.”41 On March 14, 2012, a few months before the end of 
Moreno-Ocampo’s term in office, Trial Chamber I found Lubanga guilty 
of all three child-soldiering crimes.42 It is to evaluation of that judgment, 
as well as subsequent rulings on sentencing and reparations,43 that this 
Article now turns. 
II. LUBANGA TRILOGY 
The first decision in the 2012 Lubanga trilogy was the judgment issued 
in accordance with Article 74 of the Rome Statute.44 Over the course of 
nearly 600 pages, Trial Chamber I detailed its reasons for convicting the 
defendant Lubanga, who in 2000 had become the President of Union des 
patriotes congolais and Forces patriotiques pour la libération du Congo, 
an Ituri-based political organization and its militia.45 The chamber—
composed of Presiding Judge Adrian Fulford of Britain, along with Judges 
René Blattmann of Bolivia and Elisabeth Odio Benito of Costa Rica—
chose not to begin with a statement of “special duty” toward children 
along the lines of the Prosecutor’s proclamation six years earlier.46 Quite 
to the contrary, an initial portion of the judgment was devoted to a lengthy 
recitation of the trial’s starts and stops.47 Trial Chamber I twice had stayed 
proceedings on account of prosecutorial nondisclosure: first, of 
exculpatory evidence; and second, of the name of a Congolese 
intermediary through whom the prosecution had kept in contact with 
 
 
 41. Moreno-Ocampo statement, supra note 40, at 2 (original’s separation of sentences into 
distinct paragraphs, and boldfacing of certain passages, omitted). 
 42. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 14. Moreno-Ocampo’s term ended on June 15, 2012, the date 
on which Fatou Bensouda was sworn in as the new Prosecutor. See Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., 
Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of the ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda (June 15, 2012), http:// 
www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr811.aspx (reporting 
on swearing-in ceremony in press release); see also Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor Elect of the 
International Criminal Court, Statement at the Ceremony for the solemn undertaking of the Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court, at 2 (June 15, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/561C23 
2F-3C4F-47AC-91CB-8F78DCC6C3FD/0/15062012FBSolemnUndertaking.pdf (describing evolution 
of Office of the Prosecutor since Moreno-Ocampo took office in 2003). 
 43. Lubanga Sentencing, supra note 14; Lubanga Reparations, supra note 14. 
 44. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 14; see ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 74 (setting forth 
requirements with regard to the conduct of trial and post-trial deliberations, the proper basis of the 
verdict, the contents of the written judgment, and the open-court delivery of the verdict). 
 45. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 14, ¶¶ 67–81 (describing the accused and his militia). 
 46. See Moreno-Ocampo statement, supra note 40. 
 47. See Lubanga Judgment, supra note 14, ¶¶ 178–484. 
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witnesses in the field.48 The judgment in Lubanga reviewed the use of 
such go-betweens—some of whom were paid, and one of whom was 
affiliated with the Congolese intelligence service—and made clear the 
chamber’s position that “the prosecution should not have delegated its 
investigative responsibilities to the intermediaries” to the degree that it 
had.49 
Trial Chamber I further determined that three intermediaries may have 
induced false testimony, and for this it exacted significant costs. Not only 
did the chamber order investigations of the three intermediaries, but it also 
stripped four persons with whom those intermediaries had worked of the 
privilege of taking part in any post-trial reparations.50 And it excluded, on 
ground of unreliability, the direct testimony of multiple witnesses who 
said they had served as underage child soldiers in defendant’s militia.51 
Having thus winnowed the evidence on which it would rely, Trial 
Chamber I addressed the substance of the allegations. Prosecutors had 
charged the accused under the Rome Statute provision pertaining to a 
person who commits an offense within the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
“whether as an individual, jointly with or through another person, 
regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible . . . .”52 
To apply the provision in the case at hand, Trial Chamber I used a five-
part test for individual criminal liability, made up of both mental and 
objective elements, which a Pre-Trial Chamber had developed earlier in 
the litigation.53 
 
 
 48. Id. ¶ 10. 
 49. Id. ¶¶ 198–205, 302, 482. 
 50. Id. ¶¶ 483–84. 
 51. Id. ¶¶ 479–83. 
 52. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 25(3)(a); see Lubanga Judgment, supra note 14, ¶¶ 917–1018 
(fixing the meaning of this provision). 
 53. “[T]he prosecution must prove in relation to each charge,” the chamber wrote, that: 
(i) there was an agreement or common plan between the accused and at least one other co-
perpetrator that, once implemented, will result in the commission of the relevant crime in the 
ordinary course of events; 
(ii) the accused provided an essential contribution to the common plan that resulted in the 
commission of the relevant crime; 
(iii) the accused meant to conscript, enlist or use children under the age of 15 to participate 
actively in hostilities or he was aware that by implementing the common plan these 
consequences “will occur in the ordinary course of events”; 
(iv) the accused was aware that he provided an essential contribution to the implementation of 
the common plan; and 
(v) the accused was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an 
armed conflict and the link between these circumstances and his conduct. 
Lubanga Judgment, supra note 14, ¶ 1018; see id. ¶¶ 918–33 (describing test in context of prior 
ruling). Judge Fulford made clear his preference that a more lenient test be applied in future cases. 
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A chamber majority concluded that the Prosecutor had proved the 
existence in Ituri of an internal, but not of an international, armed 
conflict.54 Thus it construed only the criminal prohibition related to the 
former type of conflict; specifically, the Rome Statute proscription against 
“[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into 
armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities.”55 That provision was held to consist of three discrete acts: 
conscription, enlistment, and use.56 The trial chamber distinguished the 
first two acts by ruling that conscription entails coercion, while enlistment 
connotes voluntary joinder.57 This proved a distinction without a 
difference, however. Finding in the Rome Statute a purpose of “protecting 
vulnerable children, including when they lack information or alternatives,” 
the chamber unanimously refused to entertain any contention that a person 
under fifteen years old had consented to join.58 To admit a child in this age 
group into an armed force, “with or without compulsion,” thus was held to 
constitute an ICC crime.59 
That collapsing of two acts into one stood in tension with an ancient 
canon—Verba aliquid operari debent, verba cum effectu sunt 
accipienda—by which each term in a statute ought to be accorded a 
separate meaning.60 Professor Drumbl has taken aim at the judicial 
conflation of enlistment and conscription on the additional ground that it 
 
 
Lubanga Judgment, supra note 14 (Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford), ¶¶ 14–20. One 
member of the chamber that acquitted a defendant in the second ICC trial, see supra note 15, voiced 
her agreement with Judge Fulford’s view. See Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, 
Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den 
Wyngaert (Dec. 18, 2012), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/docs/doc1529537.pdf. For 
commentary on this issue, see Amann, Lubanga, supra note 40, at 811, 815–16; Kai Ambos, The First 
Judgment of the International Criminal Court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga): A Comprehensive Analysis of 
the Legal Issues, 12 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 115, 138–51 (2012). 
 54. Compare Lubanga Judgment, supra note 14, ¶¶ 568–69 (reasoning supported by Judges 
Fulford and Blattmann), with id. (Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito), ¶¶ 9–14 
[hereinafter Odio Benito dissent/Lubanga Judgment] (contending that an international conflict also had 
been proved). See Amann, Lubanga, supra note 40, at 810–11 (describing the nature-of-conflict issue 
in more detail); Ambos, supra note 53, at 128–31 (2012) (same). 
 55. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 8(2)(e)(vii). 
 56. See Lubanga Judgment, supra note 14, ¶ 600. 
 57. Id. ¶ 609; see Ambos, supra note 53, at 134 (noting that this ruling conformed to “settled” 
doctrine). 
 58. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 14, ¶ 617; see id. ¶¶ 607–17 (describing expert testimony and 
other sources on which the chamber relied). 
 59. Id. ¶ 618. 
 60. See JAMES ARTHUR BALLENTINE, A LAW DICTIONARY 513 (1916) (setting forth the 
Latinism); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 174 (2012) (stating, in contemporary English, that the canon counsels judges to give effect 
whenever possible to “every word and every provision”). 
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artificially deprives enlistees of what social theorists call “agency”; that is, 
of free will to consent to join a militia.61 His complaint warrants close 
consideration with respect to instruments that define any militia member 
under age eighteen as a child soldier, and thus would deny volition to 
older teens.62 But the Rome Statute is not among those instruments. 
Putting to one side the contradictory canon of construction,63 there is merit 
in the adoption in Lubanga of a bright-line rule deeming consent 
impossible within the age group at issue in the Rome Statute: children 
fourteen and under. 
The precise words of the third prohibited act, “using them to participate 
actively in hostilities,”64 invited the judges in Lubanga to consider a range 
of interpretations. At its narrowest, the provision could be said to ban only 
the deployment of children as weapons-carrying, front-line combatants. At 
its broadest, it could be construed to comprehend any placement of 
children in service to the militia, at base camps as well as on the front 
lines. Judge Odio Benito argued for the broadest construction; calling for 
“a comprehensive legal definition,” she articulated a “duty” to include 
within the definition of use not only combat-related harms, but also “the 
sexual violence and other ill-treatment suffered by girls and boys,” even if 
far from the zone of combat.65 But her two colleagues disagreed. Opting 
for a middle path, the chamber majority ruled that if children had been 
“exposed . . . to real danger as a potential target,” even outside of “the 
 
 
 61. See DRUMBL, supra note 23, at 13–15 (writing that negation of adolescents’ “volunteerism” 
stands in tension with empirically derived understandings of juvenile autonomy); see also Ambos, 
supra note 53, at 136 (making similar point). 
 62. E.g., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000) (calling on 
states parties to raise to eighteen the minimum permissible age for participation in armed conflict); 
International Labour Organization Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate 
Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour arts. 2–3, June 17, 1999, 2133 
U.N.T.S. 161 (defining “child” as anyone under eighteen, and declaring “forced or compulsory 
recruitment of children for use in armed conflict”). 
 63. That is not to say that this is a concern without merit. See Ambos, supra note 53, at 135 
(laying bare the logical impossibility of conjoining the two statutory terms). The interpretive problem 
would not have arisen if drafters of the Rome Statute had followed the lead of the Additional Protocols 
to the Geneva Convention, quoted supra note 34, and so proscribed recruitment, singly, rather than 
bifurcating that term into disjunctive acts of conscription or enlistment. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 253–54 (2010) 
(discussing drafting history that led to this provision). 
 64. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 8(2)(e)(vii), quoted in supra text accompanying note 55. 
 65. Odio Benito dissent/Lubanga Judgment, supra note 54, ¶¶ 7–8, 14–21. But see Ambos, supra 
note 53, at 137–38 n.156 (contending that Odio Benito’s interpretation “violates the strict construction 
requirement” of ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 22(2)). 
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immediate scene of the hostilities,” those children had been used in a 
manner that violated the Rome Statute.66 
Trial Chamber I held that the prosecution had demonstrated beyond a 
reasonable doubt the defendant’s responsibility both for the forcible and 
nonforcible recruitment of children into his militia and for the use of those 
children in an array of forbidden roles.67 Essential to that conclusion were 
videotapes. Footage showed the defendant surrounded by very young 
children who were serving as his bodyguards.68 In one video, the 
defendant led a rally at a training camp, in the presence of “recruits who 
were clearly under the age of 15.”69 As that phrasing indicates, the 
chamber determined whether the militia included underage children 
simply by looking at the images on the videos in evidence. The chamber 
derived further support for its judgment of conviction from pre-arrest 
statements of the defendant, from evidence of his status as a leader, and 
from testimony of aid workers who had talked with former child soldiers.70 
Finally, the chamber discussed at length its reliance on the testimony of 
expert witnesses like Elisabeth Schauer, a trauma specialist, and Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, at the time of trial the United Nations’ Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed 
Conflict.71 
Four months after the delivery of the verdict in Lubanga, Trial 
Chamber I cited these items of evidence as grounds for imposing a 
concurrent sentence of fourteen years.72 Specifically, the chamber wrote, 
the evidence showed: first, that the “widespread recruitment and 
 
 
 66. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 14, ¶ 628. 
 67. Id. ¶¶ 632–916. 
 68. Id. ¶¶ 858–62. 
 69. Id. ¶ 792; see id. ¶¶ 15, 793, 858, 861–62, 869. 
 70. See id. ¶¶ 1023–1357. 
 71. See id. ¶ 11 n.29 (noting that the chamber had called four witnesses, among them Schauer 
and Coomaraswamy). Schauer, whose title and affiliation were not set forth in the principal opinion, 
was discussed in id. ¶¶ 478, 606 n.1772, 610. Judge Odio Benito described Schauer as an “expert 
witness on the topic of children with trauma, particularly post-traumatic stress disorder.” Odio Benito 
dissent/Lubanga Judgment, supra note 54, ¶ 30. Coomaraswamy’s title was stated at Lubanga 
Judgment, supra note 14, ¶ 577; she was discussed id. ¶¶ 592, 598, 606, 607 n.1775, 611, 615, 626 
n.1799, 630 n.1811. Her written comments may be found at Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06-1229-AnxA, Written Submissions of the United Nations Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict Submitted in application of Rule 103 of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence (Mar. 18, 2008), available at http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/ 
documents/AmicuscuriaeICCLubanga.pdf. 
 72. See Lubanga Sentencing, supra note 14, ¶¶ 39–43, 49, 97–99; id. (Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Odio Benito), ¶ 26 [hereinafter Odio Benito dissent/Lubanga Sentencing] (arguing for a fifteen-
year sentence on each count); see also Amann, Lubanga, supra note 40, at 813–14 (treating sentencing 
decision at greater length). 
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significant use of child soldiers” had carried serious consequences; 
second, that the accused was an “intelligent and well-educated man,” who 
“was simultaneously the Commander-in-Chief of the army and its political 
leader,” who “would have understood the seriousness of the crimes”; and 
third, that the accused had made an “essential contribution” to their 
commission.73 
The chamber’s exclusion of much eyewitness testimony did not put an 
end to the prosecution in Lubanga. Yet exclusion did sap strength from the 
prosecution’s case, for it tended to put distance between the actual 
experiences of children in the militia and the credited evidence of those 
experiences.74 Compounding this effect were the adoption of a complex 
test for liability and of a middle-path interpretation of “using” children “to 
participate actively in hostilities.”75 By way of example, the Prosecutor 
had adduced evidence that the defendant’s militia had subjected some 
children to whippings, canings, and other harsh punishments.76 Viewing 
the evidence “as part of the context in which children under the age of 15 
were conscripted, enlisted and used,” the majority did not expressly hold 
the accused responsible for such punishments.77 The application of the 
middle-path interpretation also seemed to have the effect of treating 
experiences of girls differently from those of boys.78 Evidence at trial also 
had shown that girls in the militia—some of them as young as twelve—
 
 
 73. Lubanga Sentencing, supra note 14, ¶¶ 52, 56, 97 (internal quotation marks and citation to 
Lubanga Judgment, supra note 14, omitted). 
 74. In the justice systems of some common-law states, evidentiary rules call for the exclusion of 
much hearsay evidence. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801–07. That is not the case at the ICC, however; the 
Rome Statute permits judges to rely on such evidence, “taking into account, inter alia, the probative 
value of the evidence and any prejudice that such evidence may cause to a fair trial or to a fair 
evaluation of the testimony of a witness.” ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 69(4). 
 75. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 8(2)(e)(vii); see supra text accompanying notes 64–66 
(describing this interpretation). 
 76. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 14, ¶¶ 883–89, 913. 
 77. Id. ¶ 889; see infra text accompanying notes 86–88 (describing chamber’s refusal to accept 
these allegations in aggravation of sentence). One commentator has contended that expanding the 
meaning of “use” beyond direct participation also may expand the scope of children who, in 
accordance with principles of international humanitarian law, could be deemed subject to targeting by 
enemy forces. Roman Graf, The International Criminal Court and Child Soldiers: An Appraisal of the 
Lubanga Judgment, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 1, 16–21 (2012). 
 78. Judge Odio Benito decried this differentiation. See Odio Benito dissent/Lubanga Judgment, 
supra note 54, ¶ 21 (“It is discriminatory to exclude sexual violence which shows a clear gender 
differential impact from being a bodyguard or porter which is mainly a task given to young boys.”); 
Odio Benito dissent/Lubanga Sentencing, supra note 72, ¶ 13 (deeming it “essential to keep in mind 
the differential gender effects and damages that these crimes have upon their victims, depending on 
whether they are boys or girls”). On the complexity of female membership in militias, see MEGAN H. 
MACKENZIE, FEMALE SOLDIERS IN SIERRA LEONE: SEX, SECURITY, AND POST-CONFLICT 
DEVELOPMENT 51–62 (2012). 
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were sexually abused by militia commanders and others.79 The chamber 
recalled that one witness, a former soldier in the defendant’s militia, had 
testified that 
Commander Abelanga had a particular girl with him for a 
considerable period of time, in Mongbwalu and in Bunia. It was 
commonly known and commented on that this girl was Commander 
Abelanga’s “wife.” She prepared the commander’s food and 
notwithstanding her saying “I don’t want to,” her cries were heard 
at night.80 
In the paragraph immediately following, the judgment stated: 
In the view of the Majority, given the prosecution’s failure to 
include allegations of sexual violence in the charges, as discussed 
above, this evidence is irrelevant for the purposes of the Article 74 
Decision save as regards providing context. Therefore, the Chamber 
has not made any findings of fact on the issue, particularly as to 
whether responsibility is to be attributed to the accused.81 
In effect, the paragraph turned a deaf ear to the night-time cries of a girl 
who had been forced into a so-called marriage before she had reached her 
fifteenth birthday.82 The statement that “this evidence is irrelevant” 
prompted the question why the judgment mentioned the tragic story of this 
girl at all. The finding of irrelevance hinged in part on the majority’s 
decision to construe use to preclude consideration of some experiences 
that children endured in the militia.83 Yet the majority did not make this 
linkage explicit; rather, it indicated that such evidence was “irrelevant” for 
 
 
 79. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 14, ¶¶ 890–95. A witness who met many of these girls 
through her work in a U.N. child protection program testified that “all the girls she met at the 
demobilisation centres, except for a few who had been protected by certain women in the camps,” said 
“they had been sexually abused, most frequently by their commanders but also by other soldiers. Some 
fell pregnant, resulting in abortions,” she testified, adding “that the psychological and physical state of 
some of these young girls was catastrophic.” Id. ¶ 890; see id. ¶ 645 (describing the witness, 
denominated “P-0046” in the judgment). 
 80. Id. ¶ 896 (footnote citations to trial record omitted). 
 81. Id. ¶ 896; see also id. ¶ 340 (using the acronym for the defendant’s militia in describing the 
witness, denominated throughout the judgment as “P-0038,” as “an alleged former UPC soldier”). 
 82. See id. ¶ 895 (reciting the same witness’s testimony that “Commander Abelanga kept a girl 
under 15 years old,” in an apparent reference to the girl described in the quotation supra text 
accompanying note 80). For a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of forced marriage, see, for 
example, Monika Satya Kalra, Forced Marriage: Rwanda’s Secret Revealed, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. 
& POL’Y 197 (2001). 
 83. See supra text accompanying notes 64–66. 
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the sole reason that the Prosecutor had not charged sexual offenses as a 
stand-alone offense.84 
The same majority reprised that stance in the Lubanga sentencing 
decision rendered in July 2012, after Bensouda had succeeded Moreno-
Ocampo.85 The majority stressed that “the former Prosecutor” had not 
introduced sexual violence evidence in the sentencing phase, and further 
determined that the evidence at trial did not establish that the defendant 
was responsible for “sufficiently widespread” violence of this nature; 
therefore, it declined to consider sexual and gender-based violence as a 
factor in aggravation of sentence.86 It likewise found insufficient proof 
either that the whippings, canings, and harsh punishments had occurred 
“in the ordinary course,” or that the accused had “ordered or encouraged” 
such mistreatment.87 Judge Odio Benito again dissented, arguing that the 
punishments and sexual abuse had been proved and should have been 
taken into account in imposition of sentence.88 
No disagreement surfaced in the chamber’s last decision, its August 
2012 statement of principles and procedures to be followed in awarding 
“reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, 
compensation, and rehabilitation,” pursuant to the Rome Statute.89 The 
reparations system established by the statute, Trial Chamber I wrote, 
“reflects a growing recognition in international criminal law that there is a 
need to go beyond the notion of punitive justice, towards a solution which 
is more inclusive, encourages participation and recognises the need to 
provide effective remedies for victims.”90 The defendant could choose to 
contribute to this process through an apology, but in the view of the 
chamber, he could not be ordered to apologize; nor could he be ordered to 
pay monetary reparations, for he had been found indigent.91 The Trust 
 
 
 84. That decision rankled elsewhere, too. E.g., Mark A. Drumbl, International Decisions: 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 841, 846–47 (2007) (describing a 
“disconnect” between the expressive potential of the child-soldiering prosecution and the reported 
anger of many Congolese because “‘the ICC has not charged Lubanga with more serious crimes,’” 
such as “‘mass murder, rape, mutilation, and torture’”) (quoting Phil Clark, In the Shadow of the 
Volcano: Democracy and Justice in Congo, 54 DISSENT 29, 34 (2007)). 
 85. With regard to Bensouda’s swearing-in on June 15, 2012, see supra note 42 and authorities 
cited. 
 86. Lubanga Sentencing, supra note 14, ¶¶ 60–76. 
 87. Id. ¶¶ 57–59. 
 88. See Odio Benito dissent/Lubanga Sentencing, supra note 72, ¶¶ 4–26. Cooling the fervor of 
her dissent was her assessment that these added offenses warranted, in toto, just one additional year in 
prison. See id. ¶ 26. 
 89. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 75; see generally Lubanga Reparations, supra note 14. 
 90. Lubanga Reparations, supra note 14, ¶ 177. 
 91. Id. ¶¶ 179, 241, 269. 
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Fund for Victims thus was instructed to work with persons in the affected 
Ituri communities in order to develop—for eventual approval by Trial 
Chamber I—a “broad and flexible,” “gender-inclusive,” and “community-
based” approach.92 Collective reparations, to entities like schools and 
nonprofit organizations as well as to persons, were to be the focus, 
although especially vulnerable persons, such as those subjected to sexual 
violence or infected with HIV, might receive individual awards.93 Victims 
could be included even if they had not taken part in the trial.94 The term 
“victim” was held to encompass “direct victims” of illegal conscription, 
enlistment, or use of child soldiers, as well as “indirect victims,” such as 
family members or persons who had been injured in attempts to help the 
children.95 The chamber ruled that claimants must show by a balance of 
probabilities that “the crimes for which Mr Lubanga was convicted were 
the ‘proximate cause’ of the harm for which reparations are sought.”96 
Embedded in that but/for test97 is a dilemma that permeates many 
aspects of the child-soldier phenomenon: as participants in an armed 
conflict, children simultaneously may do harm and be harmed.98 The 
Rome Statute exempts them from prosecution;99 indeed, on conviction of 
their adult commander, it makes them eligible for reparations. The 
 
 
 92. Id. ¶¶ 161, 180, 202, 260–88 (specifying, too, that different judges would compose the 
chamber). “[F]or the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and of the 
families of such victims,” the Rome Statute required the ICC Assembly of States Parties to establish 
such a fund. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 79(1). The Assembly did so in 2002. See About Us, TRUST 
FUND FOR VICTIMS, http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/about-us (last visited Aug. 1, 2013). 
 93. Lubanga Reparations, supra note 14, ¶¶ 180, 194–202, 207–09, 217–22, 254, 274, 288. With 
regard to the potential size of the reparations pool, see Financial Info, TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, 
http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/financial-info (last visited Aug. 1, 2013) (“The TFV Board 
approved € 1.9 million in project extensions (2013–2014) in DRC and Uganda, in addition to € 1 
million previously approved resources for on-going projects in DRC and Uganda and the planned 
programme in Central African Republic (CAR; € 607,000).”). 
 94. Lubanga Reparations, supra note 14, ¶¶ 154, 187. 
 95. Id. ¶¶ 194–96. See Ambos, supra note 53, at 117 (calling for “a comprehensive strategy” that 
constrains “the number of indirect victims-participants in a reasonable way” and writing that Trial 
Chamber I “makes no attempt to develop” one). 
 96. Lubanga Reparations, supra note 14, ¶ 250. 
 97. Id. ¶ 250 (describing the test, in same sentence as the phrasing quoted supra text 
accompanying note 96, as “a ‘but/for’ relationship between the crime and the harm”). 
 98. See Amann, Children, supra note 39, at 168 (referring to child soldiers’ “dual status as 
perpetrators and as victims of atrocities”); Diane Marie Amann, Message As Medium in Sierra Leone, 
7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 237, 243 (2001) (recounting the challenge posed by, on the one hand, “the 
desire of the people of Sierra Leone to call war criminals to account regardless of age and,” on the 
other hand, “the concern of human rights organizations that prosecution would undercut 
rehabilitation”); see also DRUMBL, supra note 23, at 80–82 (examining conditions under which 
children commit atrocities in combat). 
 99. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 26 (stating that the ICC “shall have no jurisdiction over 
any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime”). 
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reparations standard in Lubanga, that the claimant was harmed because of 
the illegal recruitment and use of child soldiers, would seem to mean that 
the victims most likely to benefit are the victims most likely also to have 
contributed to harm; specifically, the victims who were under fifteen when 
they fought in combat or were otherwise “exposed . . . to real danger as a 
potential target.”100 Priority of course also would be given to any civilian 
who was injured, or who lost a loved one, or a home, at the hands of 
underage combatants. Yet the proximate cause standard, if interpreted 
strictly, would seem daunting to satisfy. Other victims of the conflict 
might receive little or no compensation; civilians whose harms were less 
proximate to child soldiering, for example, as well as children in the 
militia targeted not by the enemy, in combat, but by their commanders and 
comrades, in camps.101 
Auguring the exclusion of this last group of children was the majority’s 
determination that away-from-the-battlefield abuses do not amount to uses 
of children punishable by the ICC. At first blush one might regard that 
construction as moderate, given that it lies midway between opposite 
interpretive poles. Yet examination of all three Lubanga decisions in full 
leaves a reader to wonder whether the provision might have been 
interpreted to take into account more of the harms that girls and boys 
experienced in the militia, were it not for the chamber’s expressed 
intention to lay blame at the court’s first Prosecutor, Moreno-Ocampo. 
Reprimand reached Moreno-Ocampo’s decision not to include sexual 
violence charges; what is more, it extended to the evidence that the 
Prosecutor introduced as proof of the defendant’s responsibility for 
offenses that the Prosecutor did charge. Consider the prosecution’s first 
witness in Lubanga. Asked about his prior account of life as a child 
soldier, he blurted, “‘It’s not true.’”102 The testimony of this witness, then 
about eighteen years old, was suspended for more than a week; on return 
to the stand, he said, “‘I am going to tell you the truth,’” and spoke of 
having been kidnapped at age eleven and forced to serve in the defendant’s 
militia.103 But in the judgment that Trial Chamber I issued, the testimony 
 
 
 100. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 14, ¶ 628, quoted supra text accompanying note 66. 
 101. In any given situation the ICC can prosecute only a handful of persons, for offenses 
representing a fraction of the overall violence; this fact, coupled with the length of the investigation, 
trial, and appeal process, would seem to recommend reconsidering whether reparations ought to be 
contingent on conviction. See Amann, Lubanga, supra note 42, at 816 (making this point). 
 102. Rachel Irwin, Lubanga Trial, Week 1: Prosecutors Stumble out of the Gate, LUBANGA TRIAL 
(Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.lubangatrial.org/2009/01/30/lubanga-trial-week-1-prosecutors-stumble-out 
-of-the-gate/ (quoting witness). 
 103. Rachel Irwin, Child Soldier: “If You Screamed, They Beat You Harder,” LUBANGA TRIAL 
(Feb. 10, 2009), http://www.lubangatrial.org/2009/02/10/child-soldier-%E2%80%9Cif-you-screamed-
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of all witnesses who said that they had been child soldiers was rejected. 
The chamber thus entered convictions without reliance on the direct 
testimony of underage members of the defendant’s militia.104 That fact 
might startle. But it also may bear promise, at least for persons concerned 
about the ordeal of the child who is made to fly thousands of miles to The 
Hague, to relate wartime experiences in a courtroom where the only 
familiar face may be the commander against whom she or he is 
testifying.105 The judgment evinced the view of Trial Chamber I that 
conviction need not depend on the testimony of children; rather, 
conviction for child soldiering may be secured on the testimony of others, 
coupled with certain documents—most importantly in Lubanga, 
videotapes of the defendant surrounded by bodyguards whose very young 
age was evident even without the benefit of birth certificates or grade-
school rosters. 
The dearth of such vital records, like the absence of direct testimony, 
nevertheless diminished the expressive impact of the Lubanga trilogy.106 It 
is to be hoped, therefore, that a richer trove of creditable evidence will be 
adduced in subsequent international prosecutions. The same also must be 
said of the chamber’s presentation. Even taken as a whole, the three 
decisions in Lubanga omitted many contextual details, such as the 
birthdate and other background about the defendant, the socioeconomic 
 
 
they-beat-you-harder%E2%80%9D/ (quoting same witness, nicknamed “Dieumerci”). 
 104. See supra text accompanying notes 47–51. 
 105. See Diane Marie Amann, A Janus Look at International Criminal Justice, 11 NW. J. INT’L H. 
RTS. 5, 14 (2013) (citing distances between sites of conflict and international criminal justice forums). 
The courtroom loomed especially foreboding to such witnesses on account of the severe 
circumscription in the ICC of what there is called “witness proofing”—a term that includes practices 
of witness preparation that attorneys in the United States would consider themselves ethically bound to 
perform. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Legal Ethics in International Criminal Defense, 10 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 685, 706 n.98 (2010) (citing ICC decisions limiting such witness preparation and noting that a 
lawyer’s position on the ethical question tends to depend on whether she was trained in an accusatorial 
or an inquisitorial system). Recently, ICC Trial Chamber V relaxed these restrictions, allowing the 
prosecution greater leeway in witness preparation. See Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, Case No. ICC-1/ 
09-01/11, Decision on Witness Preparation (Jan. 2, 2013), available in two parts at http://www. 
internationallawbureau.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/524-13.01.02-Decision-on-Witness-Preparation 
_2IN14.pdf and http://www.internationallawbureau.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/524-13.01.02-
Decision-on-Witness-Preparation_2IN15.pdf; Annex to Decision: Witness Preparation Protocol, ICC-
01/09-01/11-524 (Mar. 1, 2013), available at http://www.internationallawbureau.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/01/524-13.01.02-Decision-on-Witness-Preparation-Anx-Protocol-11.pdf. 
 106. On the relation of expressive purposes of law to international criminal justice, see, for 
example, Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 
93, 95–96, 113–32 (2002); Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at 
the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 270–71, 312–20 (2012); Mark A. Drumbl, 
Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: the Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
539, 561, 592–95 (2005). 
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geography of Ituri, the nature of the conflict there, and the numbers of 
children and other victims involved in that conflict. In contrast with 
certain passages in the first Nuremberg judgment,107 this first ICC 
judgment seldom conveyed with precision what victims endured, or why. 
Perhaps the most concrete description was that of the girl subjected to a 
forced marriage—and that narrative was deemed irrelevant to the 
chamber’s ultimate decision. The judgment of conviction in Lubanga was 
“a full and reasoned statement,” to quote the Rome Statute; however, it 
fell short of the “fully reliable record,” published “so that future 
generations can remember and be made fully cognisant of what 
happened,” to which Judge Antonio Cassese once said that international 
jurists must aspire.108 
III. A GLANCE TOWARD THE ICC’S SECOND DECADE 
The March 2012 child-soldiering conviction in Lubanga, of an ex-
leader of an Ituri-based militia, fortified the international legal norm that 
outlaws the recruitment or use of young children in armed conflict; 
nonetheless, subsequent events made clear the continued challenge of 
instilling that norm in the larger society. Two weeks after that first ICC 
judgment, The New York Times published a report from South Kivu, like 
Ituri a province in the eastern portion of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.109 Accompanying the story were two photos of children: one 
depicted a very young boy wrapped in bandages covering wounds he 
incurred when his hut was burned; the other showed young, knife-
 
 
 107. See supra text accompanying notes 24–29. 
 108. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 74(5); Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal 
Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) (emphasis omitted); see Amann, Lubanga, supra note 40, at 817 
(iterating this contention). Also addressing draftsmanship was Professor Ambos, who wrote with 
approval, on the one hand, of the chamber’s “transparency”: 
Everybody who has worked or works as a judge knows by own experience that the 
combination of evidence and facts rarely produces a clear-cut picture of what has really 
happened. Thus, judges are always riddled with doubts. It is the merit of the Chamber to have 
shared this insecurity with the reader . . . . 
Ambos, supra note 53, at 152. But on the other hand, he faulted the chamber’s “poor referencing 
standard,” and fretted that “formal inaccuracy may reflect inaccuracy in substance.” Id. at 152–53. 
 109. Stephen Castle, In Congo, Self-Defense Can Offer Its Own Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2012, 
at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/world/africa/in-congo-self-defense-can-offer-
its-own-risk.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; see Marlise Simons, Congolese Rebel Convicted of Using 
Child Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/ 
world/africa/congo-thomas-lubanga-convicted-war-crimes-child-soldiers.html. 
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brandishing members of what were labeled “self-defense militias.”110 
Despite the recency of the widely reported judgment in Lubanga, the 
Times account said nothing of the ban on child soldiering.111 In the months 
that followed, the Congolese armed conflict erupted once again: by year’s 
end, rebels said to be under the command of Lubanga’s fugitive 
codefendant, Bosco Ntaganda, had seized the capital of North Kivu, 
neighboring province to Ituri.112 These developments exposed numerous 
shortfalls of international criminal justice. Brought to the fore, to be sure, 
was a violent consequence of the failure to arrest an at-large indictee.113 
Even after the March 2013 surrender of that fugitive to the ICC,114 there 
was evident need to add new chapters to the world’s record—first 
established at Nuremberg—of the costs of armed conflict. Now, as then, 
those costs were generational, for it was alleged that youngsters again 
were among those fighting in eastern Congo.115 
The new Prosecutor, Bensouda, has pledged to construct a record of the 
experiences of children in the conflicts that come within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction. “As I have repeatedly said,” she told her New York audience 
shortly before she was sworn in, “the crimes committed towards female 
child soldiers need to be analyzed specifically. Our focus should shift from 
‘children with arms’ to ‘children who are affected by the arms’ in the 
context of the crime of enlisting and conscripting child soldiers.”116 Such a 
 
 
 110. See Castle, supra note 109; cf. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 14, ¶¶ 897–908 (noting the 
presence of “self-defence forces” during the period under review, but finding insufficient proof that the 
accused’s own militia was responsible for the presence of children in those forces). 
 111. See Castle, supra note 109. 
 112. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Rebels Exit City in Congo, Leaving Trail Of Concern, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 2, 2012, at A20 (describing attack on the North Kivu capital, Goma); David Smith, Hunting the 
Terminator: Congo continues search for Bosco Ntaganda, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Nov. 28, 2012, at 
27, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/28/terminator-search-bosco-ntaganda-
congo (reporting on allegations, albeit disputed, of Ntaganda’s involvement). 
 113. See Amann, Lubanga, supra note 40, at 816. 
 114. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Wanted Congolese Rebel Leader Surrenders, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 
2013, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/world/africa/wanted-congolese-rebel-
leader-turns-himself-in.html?_r=0. 
 115. See Children Paying High Price of DR Congo Fighting: UN, AGENCE-FR. PRESSE, July 13, 
2013, available at Westlaw, 7/26/13 Agence Fr.-Presse 20:13:41 (quoting UNICEF official’s assertion 
that upwards of 2,000 children were being used as child soldiers); DR Congo: Bosco Ntaganda 
Recruits Children by Force, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 16, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/ 
2012/05/15/dr-congo-bosco-ntaganda-recruits-children-force (stating that Ntaganda had “forcibly 
recruited at least 149 boys and young men into his forces since April 19”); Saleh Mwanamilongo, UN 
Attack Helicopters Target Rebels in Eastern Congo, Says Local Official, CAN. PRESS, Nov. 12, 2012, 
available at Westlaw, 11/17/12 Can. Press 00:00:00 (writing that another rebel leader also had been 
accused of coercing children to join the rebellion). On the post-World War II record, see supra text 
accompanying notes 16–30. 
 116. Bensouda statement, supra note 1. 
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shift would serve the purposes underlying not only the ban on child 
soldiering, but also other concerns about children made explicit in the text 
of the Rome Statute.117 Such a shift could deepen understanding of what 
war does to girls and boys, to their families, and to their communities. In 
turn, that understanding could reveal new ways to pursue basic goals of 
international criminal justice: bringing perpetrators to account, providing 
redress for victims, and preventing future conflicts. The ICC can advance 
all three goals—as it tried to do in its early years—through careful and 
consistent emphasis on the fate of children caught up in armed conflict.  
 
 
 117. See supra text accompanying notes 6–11 (discussing pertinent provisions of the ICC Statute, 
supra note 5). 
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